

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10

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SAJ-01 ACDA-19 SS-15 NSC-10 AEC-11 IO-13 OIC-04 OMB-01

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 3957

E.O. 11652: GDS 12/31/81

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR: VERIFICATION SUB-GROUP CHAIRMAN'S REVISED NOTE

REF: USNATO 3922

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF VERIFICATION SUB-GROUP CHAIRMAN'S PERSONAL NOTE WHICH HAS BEEN REVISED TO REFLECT MODIFICATIONS MADE DURING SUB-GROUP MEETING AUGUST 21 (REFTEL). STATE 167324 NOTAL JUST RECEIVED. UNLESS OTHERWISE INSTRUCTED, WE WILL MAKE POINTS IN THAT MESSAGE DURING WG MEETING AUGUST 29.

TEXT OF NOTE: QUOTE:

MBFR WORKING GROUP-SUB GROUP ON VERIFICATION

DRAFT REPORT

1. THE SUB GROUP HAS BEEN INVITED TO CARRY OUT BY 24 AUGUST AN EXAMINATION OF THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE VERIFICATION
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MEASURES FOR THE SPECIFIC REDUCTION OPTIONS OUTLINED IN THE BELGIAN, UNITED STATES, AND UK PAPERS, AGAINST THE CONTINGENCY THAT THESE OPTIONS ARE ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL. IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED THAT IN DOING SO IT SHOULD TAKE ACCOUNT

OF RELEVANT ASPECTS OF SHAPE COMMENTS ON "THE US APPROACH TO MBFR (30 APRIL 1973)".

2. THE REDUCTION FIGURES WITH WHICH WE HAVE TO DEAL ARE:-

(A) BELGIAN PAPER 20 JULY

US SOVIET
32,500 66,000

(B) UK PAPER 30 JULY

NOT MORE THAN 10 PCT OF US NOT LESS THAN 10 PCT OF
FORCES IN THE GLA, SOVIET FORCES IN GLA, TO
INCLUDING NOT MORE THAN TWO INCLUDE THREE TANK
BRIGADES DIVISIONS
(19,000) (39,000)

(C) US PAPER OF 27 JULY

US SOVIET
29,000 68,000 INCLUDING A FIVE-
DIVISION TANK ARMY

(D) GENERAL

ALL THREE PAPERS MAY BE TAKEN TO ASSUME AN AGREEMENT TO
RESPECT THE NEW LEVELS OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES
POST REDUCTION.

(E) DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE REDUCTION PACKAGES DO NOT SEEM TO
BE ENOUGH TO DEMAND DIFFERING VERIFICATION SYSTEMS, EXCEPT
TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY PLACE DIFFERING EMPHASIS ON
MANPOWER REDUCTIONS AND CEILINGS WHICH ARE VERY DIFFICULT
TO VERIFY.

3. THE US PAPER OF 27 JULY SUGGESTS SOME MEASURES WHICH,
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THOUGH NOT SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED AS SUCH, WOULD IN THE OPINION
OF THE SUB GROUP BE OF SOME ASSISTANCE IN THE PROCESS OF
VERIFICATION AND MIGHT BE SEEN AS COLLATERAL TO IT, PARTICULARLY TO
THE EXTENT THAT THEY THEMSELVES ARE VERIFIED. THESE ARE:

(A) "PRE-REDUCTION STABILIZING MEASURES" IN THE NATO
GUIDELINES AREA (GLA)

(I) PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF MOVEMENTS OF US AND SOVIET
FORCES INTO THE AREA, INCLUDING ROTATIONS;

(II) PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF MAJOR EXERCISES, BY ALL
FORCES, TOGETHER WITH LIMITS ON THEIR SIZE,

LOCATION, NUMBER AND DURATION;

(III) EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS AT MAJOR EXERCISES BY ALL FORCES;

(B) "STABILIZING MEASURES TO ACCOMPANY REDUCTIONS AND TO MAKE REDUCTIONS PROVISIONS EFFECTIVE".

(I) LIMITATIONS ON MOVEMENTS OF US/SOVIET FORCES INTO THE AREA;

(II) LIMITATIONS ON MOVEMENTS OF US/SOVIT FORCES ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES WITHIN THE AREA;

(III) NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS

4. THESE MEASURES, THOUGH NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE VERIFICATION OF REDUCTIONS AND OF AGREED POST-REDUCTION LEVELS, WOULD AFFORD AN INCREASED INSIGHT INTO WP MILITARY ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE GLA AND COULD BE REGARDED AS COLLATERAL TO VERIFICATION. INDEED WE FIND THAT THE DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN "CONSTRAINTS", "STABILIZING MEASURES" AND "MEASURES COLLATERAL TO VERIFICATION" IS FAR FROM CLEAR.

5. THE US PAPER, IN DIRECT REFERENCE TO VERIFICATION, FAVOURS CONSIDERATION OF VERIFICATION MEASURES DESCRIBED IN THE US PAPER OF 30 APRIL. THESE INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING MEASURES:-

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(A) FEWER RESTRICTIONS ON NATIONAL MILITARY ATTACHES AND MLMS;

(B) OBSERVATION OF AGREED WITHDRAWALS BY NATIONAL ATTACHES AND/OR SPECIAL GROUND OBSERVATION TEAMS CONSTITUTED FOR THIS PURPOSE;

(C) SPECIAL MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA IN THE POST-MBFR PERIOD;

(D) LIGHT AIR CAPABILITY (HELICOPTERS) FOR MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS;

(E) NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

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6. IT IS EXPLICIT IN THE VERIFICATION SECTION OF THE US PAPER OF 30 APRIL 1973 (PAGE 14) THAT VERIFICATION MAY HAVE TO DEPEND HEAVILY UPON THE NORMAL PROCESS OF COVERT INTELLIGENCE IN ITS VARIOUS FORMS. THIS THOUGHT TOGETHER WITH THE COLLATERAL MEASURES IN PARA 4 ABOVE AND THE VERIFICATION MEASURES IN PARA 5 IS IN LINE WITH AC/276-(70)WP(35) (REVISED), WHICH INTER ALIA GIVES A FULLER DESCRIPTION OF A POSSIBLE ORGANISATION FOR A MOBILE INSPECTORATE ("ADVERSARY-MANNED"). AS AN INDICATION OF THE NUMBERS REQUIRED APPENDIX B TO ANNEX, PARA 27, SUGGESTS A NATO REQUIREMENT FOR 130 TWO-MAN TEAMS TO COVER THE GLA, CALCULATED ON A SOMEWHAT SPECIALISED BASIS.

7. AS TO THE USE OF OUR MLMS AND MILITARY ATTACHES THERE IS A DANGER THAT WE MIGHT PUT THEM AT RISK BY SUGGESTING THAT THEY MIGHT BE OFFICIALLY USED FOR WHAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE HITHERETO CALLED 'SPYING'. THE ACTIVITIES OF MLMS ARE CONTROLLED BY RULES AGREED BETWEEN THEIR COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. SUCH RULES WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO BE EXAMINED AND MODIFIED BEFORE THE MISSIONS COULD CO-OPERATE IN MBFR VERIFICATION. FURTHER, ITEMS SUCH AS 3(B)(II) SHOULD BE SO DRAFTED AS NOT TO ET PRECEDENTS WHICH MIGHT BE DAMAGING FOR NATO SHOULD EUROPEAN

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FORCES BECOME INVOLVED.

8. US/SOVIET FORCES ONLY

THE PREVIOUS WORK OF THE SGVE WAS BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT NOTONLY US AND SOVIET BUT ALSO EUROPEAN FORCES WOULD BE SUBJECT TO REDUCTION AND THEREFORE TO VERIFICATION MEASURES. TO THE EXTENT THAT REDUCTIONS AND OTHER CONTROLS ARE APPLIED IN A FIRST PHASE TO US AND SOVIET FORCES THERE MIGHT BE A CASE FOR

(A) REDUCING THE SIZE OF THE INSPECTORATE

(B) MODIFYING THE NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF THE INSPECTION TEAMS

(C) IMPOSING SPECIAL RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS BY THE LATTER TO FORCES OTHER THAN US AND SOVIET.

THE VERIFICATION PROBLEM WOULD BE SIMPLER AND THUS A SMALLER INSPECTORATE MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE. (B) AND (C) ABOVE SEEM HOWEVER TO BE POLITICAL MATTERS OUTSIDE OUR COMPETENCE; IT WOULD HOWEVER BE TECHNICALLY ADVANTAGEOUS TO NATO FOR AN INSPECTORATE ADEQUATE FOR A POSSIBLE PHASE II TO BE DEPLOYED FROM THE OUTSET.

9. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE VERIFICATION SYSTEM

THE US PAPER OF 30 APRIL ANNEX E PP. 5 TO 10 OFFERS AN ESTIMATE OF US CAPABILITY TO MONITOR REDUCTIONS AND POST-REDUCTION LEVELS BY THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE PROCESS. WE SEE NO REASON TO DISSENT FROM THIS ESTIMATE; AND WE CONSIDER THAT THE MEASURES MENTIONED IN PARAS 3 AND 5 WOULD INCREASE THIS CAPABILITY. WE ALSO NOTE THE SUGGESTION IN AC/276-WP(70)35 THAT THE RUSSIANS MAY BE EXPECTED TO BE WILLING TO CO-OPERATE TO A LIMITED EXTENT IN THE MONITORING OF ACTUAL REDUCTIONS.

10. ACCEPTABILITY OF VERIFICATION MEASURES TO NATO

THE US PAPER OF 30 APRIL 1973 DRAWS ATTENTION (PAGE 14) TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOME VERIFICATION MEASURES MIGHT BE DETRIMENTAL TO NATO. THIS QUESTION WAS DEALT WITH IN

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AC276-D(72)1 WHICH CONCLUDES THAT MEASURES OF THE TYPE ENVISAGED IN THIS REPORT SHOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO NATO SUBJECT TO A FEW SIMPLE RESTRAINTS ON THE ACCESS AND SCOPE PERMITTED TO ADVERSARY INSPECTION TEAMS.

11. OBSERVATION TEAMS IN THE 3 WMDS OF THE USSR

SACEUR HAS PROPOSED THAT AGREEMENT SHOULD BE SOUGHT FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF NATO OBSERVATION TEAMS IN THE 3 WMDS OF THE USSR. EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY MIGHT OBSERVE THE MOVEMENTS OF SOVIET FORMATIONS TOWARDS THE CZECH AND POLISH FRONTIERS WITH THE POSSIBLE INTENTIONS OF CROSSING THEM ILLICITLY THIS PROPOSAL HAS MORE TO DO WITH 'EARLY WARNING' THAN 'VERIFICATION', SO WE DO NOT PURSUE IT FURTHER.

12. CONCLUSIONS

(A) THE PROPOSALS FOR VERIFICATION AND COLLATERAL MEASURES IN THE US PAPERS OF 30 APRIL AND 27 JULY ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE MEASURES DESCRIBED IN AC/276-WP(70)35

AND COULD WELL BE ADAPTED TO THE REDUCTION OPTIONS
IN THE BELGIAN, UNITED STATES AND UK PAPERS.

(B) AGREED OVERT MEASURES OF INSPECTION ARE CLEARLY
DESIRABLE. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO STATE AT THIS TAGE
THE SCALE OF INSPECTION TEAMS FOR WHICH AGREEMENT
SHOULD BE SOUGHT, NOR THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR
CONTRIBUTION TO THE VERIFICATION PROCESS.

(C) ANY DISADVANTAGES FOR NATO COULD BE REDUCED BY

(I) ADOPTION OF THE RESTRICTIONS DESCRIBED IN
AC/276-D(72)1;

(II) CAREFUL ADVANCE CONSIDERATION OF THE IMPLICATIONS
OF PROPOSING THE USE OF NATIONAL MDMS AND SERVICE
ATTACHES FOR THE OBSERVATION OF REDUCTION AND
POST-REDUCTION MEASURES.

END TEXT. RUMSFELD

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptoning: X
Capture Date: 02 APR 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 23 AUG 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: boyleja
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973NATO03957
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS 12/31/81
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19730868/abqcebrw.tel
Line Count: 293
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: USNATO 3922
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: boyleja
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 15 AUG 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <15-Aug-2001 by kelleyw0>; APPROVED <21-Sep-2001 by boyleja>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: VERIFICATION SUB-GROUP CHAIRMAN'S REVISED NOTE
TAGS: PARM, NATO
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO USCINCEUR
USNMR SHAPE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005